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death unless one of these two aggravators areproven beyond a reasonable
doubt at the penalty phase of the capital murder trial.
33
In the face of these constitutional requirements, the Supreme Court
of Virginia held in Williams that: (1) defendants are not even entitled to
pretrial notice that the Commonwealth will rely on either or both of the
statutory elements of its case for death, (2) directly contrary to Godfrey,
the language of the "vileness" factor is not vague,34 and (3) the statutory
language is vague, but the definitions of the terms found in Smith v.
Commonwealth35 provide sufficient explanation.36 The court previ-
ously held in Clark v. Commonwealth that the Smith definitions were
"not the best or the only ones."37 The court in Williams, however, refers
to the Smith definitions as "necessary," implying that they are the only
acceptable constructions. 38 To confuse the matter further, the Supreme
Court has also held that vagueness in the statutory language of an
aggravating factor is not cured by a narrowing construction that is itself
unconstitutionally vague.39 The Smith definitions are certainly suspect
under Shell, notwithstanding the cursory approval given to them in
Turner v. Murray.
40
33 Tuilaepa, supra note 29.
34 Williams, 248 Va. at 538, 450 S.E.2d 372 ("The necessary
narrowing constructions are contained in the emphasized language of the
Code § 19.2-264.4(C)" and indictments which contained this statutory
language were "sufficient to give him notice of the nature and character
of the offenses charged .... ).
35 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978) (defined the terms "aggra-
vated battery" and "depravity of mind").
Williams illustrates that the Supreme Court of Virginia is all over
the map in its efforts to uphold the application of Virginia's vague
aggravating factors. Both defendants and jurors are left in the dark
because of these efforts.
Defense counsel should continue to move for a bill of particulars
that includes all the narrowing constructions of the capital statute
aggravators on which the Commonwealth intends to rely. The brief in
support of this motion must frame the issue as a federal question, so that
if this motion is denied, the issue may be preserved for later argument to
a federal court if necessary. It is clear that Virginia courts are not
sympathetic to this claim; however, it seems inevitable that a federal
court will eventually take up this issue. It is vital that this issue be raised
and preserved at every stage to assure than when the federal courts take
the opportunity to appropriately apply the United States Constitution to
Virginia's aggravating factors, no clients will be "defaulted out" of the
benefit of that favorable ruling.
Summary and analysis by:
Timothy B. Heavner
36 Williams, 248 Va. at 538,450 S.E.2d at 372.
37 220 Va. 201,257 S.E.2d 784 (1979).
38 Williams, 248 Va. at 538, 450 S.E.2d at 372.
39 Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990) (held that there was no
meaningful distinction between the limiting construction and the
"vileness" factor itself and thus a person of ordinary sensibilities would
still be able to characterize almost every murder as falling within its
limits).
40 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
JOSEPH v. COMMONWEALTH
452 S.E.2d 862 (Va. 1995)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On the evening of October 26, 1992, Jason M. Joseph and an
accomplice, Kiasi Powell, entered a Subway Shop in Portsmouth,
Virginia. Joseph ordered a sandwich from Anderson who was behind the
counter. As the sandwich was being prepared, Joseph displayed a pistol
and ordered Anderson to open the register. Joseph then ordered Ander-
son to hand him the cash drawer and to get down on the floor behind the
counter. After receiving the drawer, Joseph indicated his intention to
shoot Anderson. Subsequently, Joseph reached over the counter, shot
and killed Anderson.1
In the first stage of a bifurcated trial, pursuant to Virginia Code
sections 19.2-264.3 and 19.2-264.4, a jury convicted Joseph of capital
murder, robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, the use of a firearm
1 Joseph v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 862, 864-65 (Va. 1995).
2 Id. at 864.
3 The court rejected some of the defendant's assignments of error
in brief, conclusive language. Others did not involve death penalty law.
On still others, the rulings provide little if any guidance because they
apply broad, settled principles of law to facts that are specific to the case
being reviewed. Issues in these categories that will not be addressed in
this summary include: (1) denial of an"Allen charge" and (2) sufficiency
of the evidence of "future dangerousness." Further, some claims were
found to have been defaulted or made solely on state law grounds,
probably barring federal review. Claims falling in these categories
included: (1) objection to Commonwealth voir dire questions (defaulted)
while committing murder, robbery and the use of a firearm while
committing murder. His punishment was fixed at imprisonment for life
on the robbery conviction and four years imprisonment for each firearnu
conviction. In the second stage of the capital murder trial, the jury fixed
Joseph's punishment at death based on "future dangerousness." 2
HOLDING
In accordance with Virginia Code sections 17-110.1(A) and 17.
110.1(F), the Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated the automatic
review of Joseph's death sentence with his appeal of the capital murdei
conviction and other convictions on appeal. The court then upheld the
convictions and death sentence.
3
and (2) objection to duplicative photographs (state law grounds). Fo
discussion ofplacing federal law grounds in all claims, see case summar3
of Cardwell, Capital Defense Digest, this issue. For discussion o
avoiding procedural default, see Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68
445 S.E.2d 670 (1994), and case summary of Breard, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 19 (1994); Pruett v. Thompson, 996 F.2d 156(
(4th Cir. 1993), and case summary of Pruett, Capital Defense Digest
Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 15 (1993). For a discussion on how to avoid procedura
default, see Groot, To Attain the Ends ofJustice: Confronting Virginia'.
Default Rules in Capital Cases, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 2, p
44 (1994).
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ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. A Potential Simmons Issue
At trial, Joseph wished to ask prospective jurors if they were aware
that alife sentence forJoseph would mean no parole eligibility for at least
twenty-five years.4 The defense again attempted to inform the jury of
parole eligibility law through a proposed jury instruction. 5 Joseph
claimed that this issue fell within the confines of Simmons v. South
Carolina,6 which required that capital defendants be permitted to com-
municate parole law tojurors.7 The trial court, however, refused both of
these attempts to inform the jury.
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirnned the trial court's ruling,
distinguishing this case from Simmons. The court held that the Simmons
ruling only applies to defendants who are parole ineligible unlike the
parole eligible defendant in this case.8 Nevertheless, Joseph preserved
an issue that could later be decided in his favor. Peculiarities of Virginia
law, and the basic rationale of Simmons, as well as some issues expressly
left undecided by the United States Supreme Court in that case, could
result in a decision that juries are entitled to this information. 9 In order
to help preserve the claim for appellants who would have been statutorily
eligible for parole consideration if sentenced to life in prison, the post-
Simmons issue should be argued on three grounds: (1) that such an
interpretation is necessary to the Eighth Amendment requirement of
enhanced reliability in capital cases, (2) that this evidence is proper for
mitigation and (3) that the basic Simmons rationale is that the due process
right to rebut the state's case for death includes a right to use parole
eligibility to rebut the "future dangerousness" aggravating factor.
IfSimmonsitself hasrevealed anything, itis the merit in maintaining
issues for federal review evenif the state courthas rejected a claim. Many
pre-Simmons capital defendants who would not havebeen parole eligible
if sentenced to life in prison are likely to be granted new sentencing
hearings, provided they raised the issue even though the Supreme Court
of Virginia was consistently rejecting it.
II. Proposed Jury Instructions
The trial court denied Joseph's proposed instruction No. S-1 which
would have told thejury that it could impose a sentence of life if there was
a reasonable doubt whether to impose life or death. 10 The Supreme Court
of Virginia found no error in the denial since the jury had been instructed
that it was the Commonwealth's burden to prove "future dangerousness"
beyond a reasonable doubt. 11
The proposed instruction and the one given by the trial court instead
do not address the same issue. The question of the standard of proof
required for an aggravating factor that is an essential prerequisite to death
eligibility12 does not address the standard to be applied in making the
4 Joseph, 452 S.E.2d at 866.
5 Id.
6 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
7 Joseph, 452 S.E.2d at 866.
8 Id.
9 After the passage of much of Governor George Allen's Proposal
X in the fall of 1994, any crime committed after January 1, 1995 will
render the perpetrator statutorily ineligible for parole. See Frank Green,
Parole act puts risk in play, critics say, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Oct.
2, 1994, at Al. Simmons will be directly applicable in those cases. For
discussion of how to preserve Simmons issues for those tried under 1994
parole law, see Pohl & Turner, IfAt First You Don't Succeed: The Real
And Potential Impact of Simmons v. South Carolinaln Virginia, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 28 (1994).
ultimate life-death decision about a death-eligible prisoner. The Su-
preme Court of Virginia also apparently failed to see the issue, as
evidenced by its citation of inappropriate authority in support of rejecting
Joseph's claim.
13
Joseph also assigned as error the trial court's denial of his requested
instruction No. S-2 which stated:
Before you may fix the punishment of defendant at death,
you must find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt,
the existence of the aggravating circumstances about which I
have previously instructed you.
I further instruct you that, under our law, you are permit-
ted to fix the punishment of defendant at life if you find that to
be the appropriate sentence, even if you find unanimously and
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the aggravating
circumstance about which I have previously instructed you.
14
Upholding refusal of the trial court to give instruction No. S-2, the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that sentencing instruction numbers one
and four, which were given, fully and fairly covered the matters requested
in the proposed instruction. 15 Instruction No. 1 provided that:
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has
proved [future dangerousness] beyond a reasonable doubt,
then you may fix the punishment of the defendant at death. But
if you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not
justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the defendant at
[life imprisonment or life imprisonment and a fine not exceed-
ing $100,000].
16
Sentencing instruction No. 4 provided that:
[M]itigating circumstances differ from aggravating ones be-
cause you are not required to be convinced beyond a reason-
able doubt that a mitigating circumstance exists before you
must take the circumstance into account as you deliberate this
case.1
7
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial court's decision by
holding that "[i]f the principles set forth in a proposed instruction are
fully and fairly covered in other instructions that have been granted, a
trial court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a repetitious
instruction."
18
The proposed instruction was not repetitious. The court apparently
found the language "if you believe from all the evidence that the death
penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the defendant
at [life imprisonment] .... ,"19 sufficient to advise the jury that Virginia
10 Joseph, 452 S.E.2d at 869.
11 Id.
12 See case summary of Tuilaepa, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7,
No. 1, p. 8 (1994).
13 The court cited Breard, 248 Va. at 86-87,445 S.E.2d at 681, and
Satcherv. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220,228 n.3,421 S.E.2d 821,843 n.3
(1992), both of which dealt with defense proffered jury instructions on
the standard of proof of aggravating factors.
14 Joseph, 452 S.E.2d at 869.
15 Id. at 869-70.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 870.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 869-70.
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law permits a sentence of life in prison even if the Commonwealth has
proven one or both aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. A
reasonable juror might conclude, however, that "if you believe from all
the evidence that the death penalty is not justified" 20 means "if the
Commonwealth has failed to prove one or more aggravating factors
beyond a reasonable doubt." In any event, Virginia Code section 19.2-
263.2 provides that courts are not to refuse instructions that are correct
statements of the law simply because they do not conform to model
instructions.
Communication from judge to jury about consideration of aggra-
vating and mitigating factors implicates important Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendment issues.2 1 Consequently, instructions such as those
rejected in Joseph should continue to be proffered. In many instances,
they will be given by the trial judge. If denied, claims of error should be
preserved on federal constitutional grounds.
HI. Sentence Review
Joseph utilized a very salutary strategy by claiming that the cumu-
lative effect of the trial court's errors produced a jury recommendation
based upon impermissible factors.22 The trial court and the Supreme
Court of Virginia summarily rejected this contention.
23
There may be great benefit, however, to Joseph's argument of error
based on the entirety of the record. By making a cumulative claim and
20 Id. at 869.
21 Issues raised by the court's denial of proffered defense instruc-
tions suggest a procedural barrier to the jury's consideration of mitiga-
tion evidence. Such barriers are forbidden by McKoy v. North Carolina,
494 U.S. 433, 443 (1990) (holding that a state cannot have a unanimity
requirement for the jurors consideration of mitigation evidence) and
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988) (holding that a sentencer
must be able to consider all mitigating evidence).
22 Joseph, 452 S.E.2d at 870.
23 Id.
being rejected, Joseph may have preserved on appeal some issues not
specifically addressed at trial. He has, in any event, added to the list of
claims potentially eligible for federal review. All assignments of error
should be raised broadly and narrowly.
IV. Proportionality
The Supreme Court of Virginia compared the record in this case and
the records in other capital murder cases pursuant to Virginia Code
section 17-110.1(E).24 The court explained that it paid particular
attention to cases in which the underlying felony was robbery and the
death penalty was imposed based on "future dangerousness." 25 The
court also claimed to have reviewed cases where life sentences were
imposed, citing, Whitley v. Commonwealth.26 Whitley, however, was a
case where death was imposed. In all its proportionality review the
Supreme Court of Virginia claims to review life sentence cases reaching
it. Citations to such cases are never included. Appellate counsel might
consider seeking them under Virginia Freedom of Information Act.27
Even if life cases reaching the court are considered, the pool of cases is
inadequate. Many capital cases resulting in life sentences are not ap-
pealed and others do not reach the Supreme Court of Virginia.
Summary and analysis by:
Michael H. Spencer
24 Id. at 871. This section requires that the Supreme Court of
Virginia to conduct an analysis to determine whether the death penalty
is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.
25 Id.
26 223 Va. 66, 81, 286 S.E.2d 162, 171 (1982), cert. denied. 459
U.S. 882 (1982).
27 See Heavner, Leaving No Stone Unturned: Alternative Methods
of Discovery in Capital Cases, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
CARDWELL v. COMMONWEALTH
248 Va. 501, 450 S.E.2d 146 (1994)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On January 26,1992, a badly decomposed body was found in the
woods behind a shopping center at the intersection of Patterson Avenue
and Pump Road in Henrico County. The body was identified as fifteen-
year-old Anthony Brown. He was determined to have died in November
1991. An autopsy revealed that Brown had sustained injuries to the throat
and wrist, as well as two gunshot wounds to the back of the head. It was
later determined that on November 20, 1991, Brown had travelled from
New York City to Richmond, where he was abducted, robbed and killed
by Kevin Cardwell.t
Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 501,506,450 S.E.2d 146,
150 (1994).
2 Id. at 504, 450 S.E.2d at 148-49. The jury fixed Cardwell's
A Circuit Court jury in Henrico County convicted Cardwell of
the capital murder of Anthony Brown in the commission of armed
robbery, in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-31(4) and capital
murder in the commission of an abduction with intent to extort money oi
pecuniary benefit, in violation of Code section 18.2-31 (1). The jury alse
found Cardwell guilty of related non-capital felonies and fixed punish-
ment for those offenses.2 In the second phase of the capital trial, the jury
fixed Cardwell's punishment at death for capital murder based upon the
"vileness" predicate under Virginia Code section 19.2-264.2. The court,
pursuant to Code section 19.2-264.5, sentenced Cardwell in accord witl
the jury verdicts. 3
punishment at life imprisonment for abduction, twenty years for robber3
and ten years for firearms charges as well as a $100,000 fine for the
abduction.
3 Id.
